Nonspeculative bubbles in experimental asset markets: Lack of common knowledge of rationality vs. actual irrationality by Lei, Vivian et al.
Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of
Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality
Author(s): Vivian Lei, Charles N. Noussair and Charles R. Plott
Source: Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Jul., 2001), pp. 831-859
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692246 .
Accessed: 24/02/2014 17:24
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
The Econometric Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Econometrica.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 17:24:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 4 (July, 2001), 831-859 
NONSPECULATIVE BUBBLES IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET 
MARKETS: LACK OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF 
RATIONALITY VS. ACTUAL IRRATIONALITY 
BY VIvIAN LEI, CHARLES N. NOUSSAIR, AND CHARLES R. PLOTT1 
We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the 
formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. In a setting in which 
speculation is not possible, bubbles and crashes are observed. The results suggest that the 
departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of 
rationality leading to speculation, but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of 
irrationality. Much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation, in maikets 
where speculation is possible, is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for 
participants in the experiment. 
KEYWORDS: Experiment, bubble, asset market, speculation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE RESULTS from research on experimental asset 
markets2 is the discovery, due to Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), of a 
particular class of asset market that tends to generate price "bubbles." A bubble 
is operationally defined as "trade in high volumes at prices that are considerably 
at variance from intrinsic values."3 The result has been replicated and shown to 
be robust to several changes in the experimental design (see, for example, King 
et al. (1993), Fisher and Kelly (2000), Porter and Smith (1995), Van Boening, 
Williams, and LeMaster (1993).4 In all of these studies, markets are created for 
1 We thank the National Science Foundation, the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Eco- 
nomics and Political Science, the Krannert School of Management, and the Center for International 
Business, Education and Research (CIBER) at Purdue University for Financial Support. This paper 
was presented at the Fall 1999 meetings of the Southern Economic Association. We thank Tim 
Cason, Eric Fisher, Peter Hansen, Rao Kadiyala, Dan Levin, Janet Netz, Jerry Thursby, Stefano 
della Vigna, Arlington Williams, Drew Fudenberg, and three anonymous referees, and seminar 
participants at Indiana University, Ohio State University, Stockholm University, the Institute for 
Industrial Economics in Stockholm, IUPUI, and Purdue University, for helpful comments. 
2 See Sunder (1995) or Duxbury (1995) for surveys of the experimental research on asset markets. 
3 This definition is given by King et al. (1993). 
4 The robustness tests conducted by these authors are the following. King et al. (1993) study the 
effect of allowing short selling, allowing margin buying, having equal initial endowments for each 
agent, imposing a fee on transactions, limiting the extent of price changes, adding insiders who are 
familiar with previous research on the topic and using businesspeople as subjects. None of these 
treatments successfully eliminated the bubble, though the treatment with informed insiders had 
some effect. Fisher and Kelly (2000) construct two asset markets operating simultaneously and 
observe bubbles and crashes in both markets. Porter and Smith (1995) study the effect of futures 
markets and of removing the uncertainty in dividend payoffs and find that the futures market 
somewhat reduced the extent of the deviations from fundamental values but the certain dividend 
payoffs did not. Van Boening, Williams, and LeMaster (1993) study asset markets organized as call 
markets (two-sided sealed-bid auctions), and also observe price bubbles and crashes. The only 
manipulation that has been shown to reliably eliminate bubbles and crashes is prior participation in 
at least two sessions in the same type of asset market. 
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assets with a lifetime of a finite number of periods (typically 15 or 30 periods). 
The asset pays a dividend in each period, and the dividend (apart from possibly a 
fixed terminal buyout value) is the only source of intrinsic value. The dividend 
paid is identical for each trader and the dividend process is common knowledge 
to all traders. Rather than tracking the fundamental value, the market price 
time series is usually characterized by a "boom" phase, a period of time in which 
prices are higher than fundamental values, often followed by a "crash," a 
sudden rapid drop in price. 
Several typical time series of transaction prices in this type of market can be 
found in Figure 1 of this paper. The figure illustrates the contrast between the 
observed prices and the fundamental value of the asset. For example, in the 
series NoSpecl, a boom occurs in periods 4-11 and a crash occurs in period 12. 
The results of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) have been described as 
striking (Sunder (1995)) because of their sharp contrast with theoretical predic- 
tions and with experiments in which shorter-lived assets are traded.5 
Explaining the patterns in the data presents a theoretical challenge.6 One way 
to reconcile the departures of prices from fundamental values with economic 
intuition is to postulate that the bubbles are speculative in nature, that is, that 
the prices reflect the pursuit of capital gains. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 
(1988) interpret their data in the following manner: "What we learn from the 
particular experiments reported here is that a common dividend, and common 
knowledge thereof, is insufficient to induce initial common expectations. As we 
interpret it, this is due to agent uncertainty about the behavior of others." We 
understand the conjecture implicit in this quote to suggest that the bubbles can 
occur when traders are uncertain that future prices will track the fundamental 
value, because they doubt the rationality of the other traders, and therefore 
speculate in the belief that there are opportunities for future capital gains.7 In 
this paper, we will refer to this conjecture as the speculative hypothesis. 
To see how a bubble and crash might come about if it is not common 
knowledge that traders are rational, consider a rational trader who believes that 
there may be "irrational" traders in the market, who are willing to make 
purchases at very high prices. The rational trader might make a purchase at a 
price greater than the fundamental value, believing that he will be able to 
realize a capital gain by reselling at an even higher price, either to an irrational 
trader or to a trader who also plans on reselling. Thus trading prices may be 
5See the survey by Sunder (1995) and the references therein. 
6 Because of the finite time horizon, backward induction implies that risk neutral agents must 
trade at the fundamental value, which is the expected dividend flow for the remainder of the time 
horizon. Risk aversion can lead to prices below fundamental values. Porter and Smith (1995) tested 
the hypothesis that risk aversion was the cause of the deviations from fundamental values. In this 
study the uncertainty about the dividend process was removed by having each unit of the asset pay a 
fixed amount after each period. Even if risk aversion is present, the asset should trade at the 
fundamental value. The authors continue to observe the bubble and crash pattern. 
7A similar argument was also offered as an explanation of laboratory asset market bubbles by 
Plott (1991). 
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FIGURE 1.-Time series of median transaction prices by period: NoSpec and 12-Period OneMar- 
ket sessions. 
much higher than the fundamental value when the end of the time horizon is 
sufficiently far in the future, even when all agents are rational. However, as the 
end of the time horizon approaches, the probability of realizing a capital gain on 
a purchase declines, the incentive to speculate is reduced, and the price falls 
(crashes) to the fundamental value. It need not be the case that irrational 
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traders actually exist, but only that their existence be believed to be possible. 
Notice that the ability of traders to speculate, that is to buy for the purpose of 
resale, is necessary to create these price dynamics. 
The speculative hypothesis can be precisely stated as follows: The bubbles 
occur because of the possibility of the realization of capital gains. An implication of 
the speculative hypothesis is that, if there were no possibility to realize capital 
gains, there would be no bubble. The first group of experiments reported in this 
paper, called the NoSpec treatment, considers this prediction of the speculative 
hypothesis. Markets are constructed that have a structure similar to those in 
which bubbles and crashes have been observed. In the NoSpec treatment, the 
ability to speculate is completely removed. The role of each agent is limited to 
that of either a buyer or a seller, completely eliminating the ability of any agent 
to buy for the purpose of resale. 
In the NoSpec treatment, the only possible benefit from a purchase is from 
the dividends that the asset pays out, since the unit can never be resold. Thus, a 
rational risk-neutral or risk-averse trader would never make a purchase at a 
price higher than the fundamental value in NoSpec, even if he expects the 
future price to be higher than the current price. If bubbles do not occur under 
NoSpec, it would be consistent with the argument that the desire to acquire 
capital gains is at the root of the deviations from fundamental values. If bubbles 
do occur under NoSpec, any explanation that relies on the possibility of the 
realization of capital gains, such as the lack of common knowledge of the 
rationality of market participants leading to speculation, can be ruled out as 
being the only cause of the bubble phenomenon. 
As we report below in detail, large departures of prices from fundamental 
values at high volumes are observed in NoSpec. Furthermore, the pattern of 
prices has the boom and crash features observed by Smith, Suchanek, and 
Williams (1988). We conclude that the bubbles and crashes are not caused by 
attempts to buy and to resell at a higher price. We do not claim that speculation 
does not occur in asset markets of this type, merely that speculation is not 
necessary to cause the departures from fundamental values. The fact that the 
rationality of participants is not common knowledge is well-founded, in that 
systematic errors in decision making tend to occur, such as purchases at prices 
higher than the maximum possible dividend stream and sales at prices lower 
than the minimum possible dividend stream. It is the actual presence of 
"irrational" behavior and not the lack of common knowledge of rationality that 
causes the bubbles we observe in NoSpec. 
The fact that agents systematically make unprofitable transactions suggests 
that there may be some particular aspect of the methodology of the experiment 
that encourages such behavior. One indication that subjects have difficulty 
making correct decisions in our asset markets is that much more trade occurs 
than would be expected if buyers and sellers had on average the same risk 
attitudes. In Section 4 of this paper, we report on two series of follow-up 
experiments, called the TwoMarket and TwoMarket/NoSpec treatments, which 
were designed to explore the origin of this "excess volume." These two treat- 
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ments test the Active Participation Hypothesis, a hypothesis that much of the 
trading activity in the asset market is due to the fact that the protocol of the 
experiment encourages subjects to participate actively in some manner. Since no 
activity is available other than to participate in the asset market, excess trade 
occurs. 
In the TwoMarket treatment there is another market operating simultane- 
ously along with the asset market and buying for resale is permitted in the asset 
market. The instructions are modified to emphasize to the subjects that partici- 
pation in the asset market is optional. In TwoMarket, the volume of trade in the 
asset market is low relative to benchmark experiments in which the asset market 
is the only market operating, supporting the hypothesis. However, in TwoMar- 
ket, prices also deviate considerably from the fundamental values in a majority 
of the sessions, and tend to follow a boom and crash pattern. The presence of 
boom and crash price dynamics indicates that the TwoMarket treatment fails to 
eliminate all factors that can cause price bubbles to arise. 
The TwoMarket/NoSpec treatment is identical to the TwoMarket treatment, 
except that, as in NoSpec, buying in the asset market for resale is not permitted. 
In TwoMarket/NoSpec, the volume of trade is not significantly different from 
the level that would be observed if buyers and sellers had equal risk attitudes, 
indicating the absence of excess volume. Adding the second market reduces the 
incidence of the types of errors observed in NoSpec, though it does not 
eliminate the possibility of a bubble. The results from TwoMarket and TwoMar- 
ket/NoSpec indicate that much of the trading activity in the asset markets, 
including many of the errors that are observed under NoSpec, is related to the 
Active Participation Hypothesis. 
In Section 2 we describe the design and procedures of the NoSpec and 
TwoMarket treatments. In Section 3 we report the results from the NoSpec 
treatment. In Section 4 we describe the results of the TwoMarket and TwoMar- 
ket/NoSpec treatments, and in Section 5 we list and explain our conclusions. 
2. THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1. Procedures Common to All Sessions 
Summary information about each of the sixteen sessions of the experiment is 
given in Table I. Trade in all of the markets followed continuous double auction 
rules that were implemented with the MUDA software package (see Plott and 
Gray (1990) for a description). Trade was denominated in an experimental 
currency, called "francs," which were converted to US dollars at the end of the 
experiment at a predetermined rate. The rate was common for all subjects in a 
given session and known to the subjects in advance. The conversion rates in 
each session are indicated in Table I. All of the sessions were conducted at 
Purdue University, Indiana, USA, between September, 1995 and June, 1999. All 
of the subjects were undergraduate students, who had not participated in any 
previous research experiments, though all had previous experience with the 
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE SESSIONS 
Initial Working Initial Asset Number of Conversion Possible Number of 
Session Capital Endowment Subjects Rate Dividend Periodsa 
NoSpecl 7,200/buyer 20/seller 8 300fr/$ 20,40 12 
NoSpec2 7,200/buyer 20/seller 7 300fr/$ 20,40 12 
NoSpec3 7,200/buyer 20/seller 8 300fr/$ 20,40 12 
TwoMktl 100,000/trader 10/trader 6 200fr/$ 0,8,28,60 18 
TwoMkt2 100,000/trader 10/trader 8 200fr/$ 0,8,28,60 18 
TwoMkt3 100,000/trader 10/trader 7 200fr/$ 0,8,28,60 18 
TwoMkt4 100,000/trader 10/trader 8 200fr/$ 0,8,28,60 18 
TwoMkt5b 100,000/trader 10/trader 7 200fr/$ 20,40 15 
TwoMkt6 100,000/trader 10/trader 8 200fr/$ 20,40 15 
TMkt/NS1 100,000/trader 20/seller 14 200fr/$ 20,40 15 
TMkt/NS2 100,000/trader 20/seller 7 300fr/$ 20,40 15 
TMkt/NS3 100,000/trader 20/seller 15 300fr/$ 20,40 15 
OneMktl 100,000/trader 10/trader 7 200fr/$ 0,8,28,60 15 
OneMkt2 100,000/trader 10/trader 7 200fr/$ 20,40 12 
OneMkt3 100,000/trader 10/trader 7 200fr/$ 20,40 12 
OneMkt4 10,000/trader 10/trader 7 500fr/$ 20,40 12 
a The number of periods given in the table does not include the one practice period in each session, whicl 
did not count toward subjects' final earnings. 
bIn the session TwoMarket5 there existed a final buyout value of 80 units of expelimental currency. 
MUDA software in classroom exercises.8 None of the subjects had any previous 
experience with asset markets, in either a classroom or a research setting. The 
sessions described in Table I lasted on average approximately 2 hours and 45 
minutes. 
2.2. Procedures Specific to the NoSpec Sessions 
Each of the three NoSpec sessions consisted of 12 trading periods, not 
including one practice period, and each period lasted 4 minutes. The initial 
period of each session, to which we refer as period 0, was for practice only and 
earnings in period 0 did not count toward final earnings. Earnings in periods 
beginning in period 1 did count toward final earnings. In each period, subjects 
were allowed to either buy or sell units of an asset called X. Prices were quoted 
in terms of "francs," the name used for the experimental currency. Since X was 
an asset, inventories of X could be carried over from one trading period to the 
next. The cash balance available to traders to make purchases in the market, 
which we call "working capital," was also carried over from period to period. 
Working capital was denominated in "francs." Both working capital levels and 
inventories were reinitialized only once: after period 0, before the beginning of 
period 1. 
After the end of trading in each period, each unit of the asset paid a dividend 
of either 20 or 40 francs, depending on the outcome of a coin flip. Every unit of 
8 In session TwoMarket/NoSpec2, four of the subjects had participated in a previous experiment 
for a different research project, which did not involve asset markets. 
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X paid the same dividend, regardless of the identity of the owner. Thus the 
expected dividend paid on each unit of X was 30 per period and 360 over the 
course of a session. The expected value of the dividends from holding a unit 
from the current period until the end of the experiment was given by 30t, where 
t was the number of periods remaining including the current period. 
The timing of activity in a session was as follows. (1) When subjects arrived at 
the experiment, they were given approximately fifty minutes of instruction that 
focused exclusively on the use of the software. (2) The instructions for the asset 
market experiment were read for the subjects, who followed along with their 
own copy of the text, and could ask questions at any time. Subjects then took a 
quiz about the dividend process. (3) The market was opened for period O, which 
did not count toward subjects' final earnings. (4) Inventories of cash and X were 
reinitialized to the values in Table I, at the beginning of period 1, and then the 
market periods of the experiment took place. 
In the NoSpec sessions, each subject was randomly assigned to be either a 
buyer or a seller.9 Buyers were not permitted to sell units and sellers were not 
permitted to buy units. In the sessions NoSpecl and NoSpec3, there were 4 
buyers and 4 sellers; in NoSpec2, there were 4 buyers and 3 sellers. Each seller 
was endowed with 20 units of X but no working capital at the beginning of 
period 1. Each buyer was endowed with 7,200 francs of working capital but zero 
units of X at the beginning of period 1. 
In the NoSpec treatment, there was no possibility of realizing a capital gain, 
though it was of course possible to sell units at prices greater than their 
fundamental values. Because each unit of X paid on average 360 over the 
course of the session, the expected final dollar payment for buyers and sellers 
was identical, under the assumption that prices track the fundamental values. 
Dividends were paper earnings, which did not add to working capital. Purchases 
and sales of X did affect working capital on hand at any point in time. The final 
earnings of each subject were equal to the total dividends he received from 
periods 1-12 plus the working capital he had remaining at the end of the 
experiment. 
2.3. Procedures Specific to the TwoMarket Treatment 
The six sessions conducted under the TwoMarket treatment had a duration of 
either 18 or 15 periods, depending on the session, not including the practice 
period. There were two markets, both organized as continuous double auctions, 
and a different commodity was traded in each market. Each agent had the 
ability to participate in both markets at any time. In one of the markets, a 
commodity called Y, with a life of one period, and which therefore can be 
thought of as a service (as in Smith (1962)) rather than an asset, was traded. The 
9Upon arriving at the session, subjects were told that they could be seated at whichever computer 
terminal they wanted. The computer terminals to be used by buyers and sellers had already been 
specified before the arrival of the subjects. 
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market for Y consisted of a one-period supply and demand market repeated 
under stationary conditions. Each participant was assigned as either a buyer or a 
seller in the Y market and the other function was disabled. Each buyer was 
endowed with an inverse demand curve and each seller was endowed with an 
inventory of 10 units of Y and an inverse supply curve.'0 Inventories of Y were 
reinitialized at the end of each period. The market for Y was open for every 
period of the session. The profits in the competitive equilibrium were between 
50 cents and 1 dollar per period for each subject. 
In the other market an asset called X was traded. All agents could both buy 
and sell X. The asset market opened for the first time in period 4. In sessions 
TwoMarketl-TwoMarket4, the asset had a life of 15 periods, and in TwoMar- 
ket5 and TwoMarket6, the asset had a life of 12 periods. As in the NoSpec 
sessions, each period lasted 4 minutes. In sessions TwoMarketl-TwoMarket4, 
the dividend distribution used was the following: each unit of X paid a dividend 
of either 0, 8, 28, or 60 francs in a given period, each dividend occurring with 
probability .25. A roll of a four-sided die determined the dividend at the end of 
each period. In TwoMarket5 and TwoMarket6, the dividend was either 20 or 40, 
each occurring with probability .5. The market for X was opened for the first 
time in period 4 and remained open every period for the remainder of the 
session. The instructions were written in a manner, that was intended to provide 
no bias toward action or toward inaction in the asset market and stressed that 
participation in either market was optional and not necessarily expected. The 
following sentence was written in bold block letters in the instructions: "You are 
not required to participate in either of the markets if you choose not to. It may be to 
your advantage not to participate in either or it may be to your advantage to 
participate in one or both. You should decide what might be in your best interest and 
make your choice accordingly." The instructions for the service market were 
given and read to subjects before period 0, and the instructions for the asset 
market were given and read to subjects before period 4. 
10 All buyers were endowed with one of two possible demand curves and all sellers were endowed 
with one of two possible supply curves. The actual marginal valuations for some buyers were 780, 
730, 690, 670, 630, 600, 570 for the first through seventh units they purchased. For the rest of the 
buyers, the marginal valuations were 790, 730, 680, 670, 630, 600, and 570 for the first through 
seventh unit they purchased. The sellers had either marginal cost of 570, 620, 660, 690, 720, 750, and 
780 for their first seven units or 560, 620, 670, 680, 720, 750, and 780 for their first seven units. In 
each session there was at least one buyer of each type and one seller of each type. If the number of 
buyers and sellers was equal, the competitive equilibrium quantity traded equaled three times the 
number of sellers and any price in the range 670-680 was a competitive equilibrium price. In the 
equilibrium, each buyer purchased three units and each seller sold three units. These same marginal 
valuations and costs were used in all sessions of the TwoMarket and TwoMarket/NoSpec treat- 
ments except for session TwoMarketl, in which the inverse demand and supply curves used in the 
experiment were identical to those above except that they were shifted downward by 40 units of 
currency. Competitive equilibrium profits in the Y market, assuming a price of 675, the midpoint of 
the range of equilibrium prices, are identical for each agent when there are an equal number of 
buyers and sellers, as there were in all of the TwoMarket sessions with an even number of 
participants. 
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In the TwoMarket sessions, the working capital available was 100,000, a very 
large amount relative to the prices in the markets. The dividends earned were 
paper earnings that did not affect working capital. Purchases in either the X or 
the Y market reduced available working capital, and sales in either the X or the 
Y market increased the amount of working capital. Final earnings equaled the 
sum of the earnings in the two markets minus initial working capital. Thus, 
the initial working capital can be viewed as a loan from the experimenter to the 
subject to be paid back at the end of the experiment. 
The timing of activity in each session of TwoMarket was the following.1" (1) 
Subjects were given instruction in the use of the software. (2) The instructions 
for the Y market, the service market, were read for subjects, who were allowed 
to ask questions. (3) The market for Y was opened for period 0, which did not 
count toward subjects' final earnings. (4) Market periods 1-3 of the experiment 
took place. These periods counted toward subjects' earnings. Only the market 
for Y was open. (5) After the end of period 3, the instructions for the X market 
were read. Subjects then took a quiz about the dividend process. (6) Periods 
4-18, in which both markets were open and which counted toward subjects' final 
earnings, took place. 
2.4. Procedures Specific to the TwoMarket/NoSpec Treatment 
The three sessions conducted under the TwoMarket/NoSpec treatment con- 
sisted of 15 periods, not including the practice period. All of the procedures and 
timing of activity were identical to the TwoMarket treatment, except for the 
following differences. In the market for X each agent was either a buyer or a 
seller of X but not both, as in NoSpec. Subjects had the same role in both 
markets; a subject who was a buyer (seller) in the Y market was also a buyer 
(seller) in the X market. Each seller received an initial endowment of 20 units 
of X. The conversion rate was 300 francs to $1 in sessions 2 and 3, and 200 
francs to $1 in session 1. Buyers were privately informed during period 4, the 
first period of operation of the asset market, that they would be given a bonus of 
$24 ($25 in session 1) on paper, in addition to their earnings in the markets. The 
bonus was designed to equalize expected earnings between buyers and sellers. 
The sellers' endowment of 20 units of X, each with an expected lifetime 
dividend stream of 360 francs, yielded an expected value of 7200 francs or, at a 
conversion rate of 300 francs = $1, an expected value of $24. The dividend 
process in the asset market was either 20 or 40 francs per period as in the 
NoSpec sessions, TwoMarket5, and TwoMarket6. Initial endowment of X was 
11 Before the beginning of each session, each subject was required to sign a consent form 
indicating that if he finished the experiment with negative earnings, he would be required to pay the 
experimenter the amount of his losses. The design of the NoSpec treatment and session OneMar- 
ket4 ensured that losses were impossible in those sessions. Because bubbles occurred in those 
sessions, we are confident that the bubbles observed in this study are not caused by the possibility 
that subjects may have perceived their liability as limited. 
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20 for each seller and 0 for each buyer. In all other respects the procedures were 
identical to those of the TwoMarket treatment. 
2.5. Procedures Specific to the OneMarket Treatment 
The four OneMarket sessions provided a benchmark with which all of the 
other treatments could be compared. At any time, there was one market open in 
which an asset, identical to those described above, was traded. Buying for resale 
was possible. In sessions OneMarket2, OneMarket3, and OneMarket4,12 the 
asset had a life of 12 periods and the dividend in each period had a 50% chance 
of equaling 20 francs and a 50% chance of equaling 40 francs. Thus the data 
from these three sessions can be compared with the data from NoSpec, Two- 
Market5, TwoMarket6, and TwoMarket/NoSpec. In session OneMarketl, the 
asset had a life of 15 periods, and the dividend process was identical to sessions 
TwoMarketl-TwoMarket4, enabling clear comparisons between those four ses- 
sions and OneMarketl. 
3. RESULTS FOR THE NOSPEC SESSIONS 
The time series of median transaction prices by period in each of the NoSpec 
sessions, as well as the three comparable benchmark sessions OneMarket2, 
OneMarket3, and OneMarket4, are given in Figure 1.13 In period 1 of two of the 
three NoSpec sessions, the median price is below the fundamental value, as it 
tends to be in the previous studies cited in Section 1. In NoSpecl, the median 
price was higher than the fundamental value from period 4 until the end of the 
session. In NoSpec2, a boom lasts from period 2 until period 6. During periods 7 
and 8, no transactions occur. The median price is again higher than the 
fundamental value between periods 9 and 12. In NoSpec3 the median price in 
every period of the session is greater than the fundamental value. A crash, a 
sudden large drop in price toward the fundamental value, occurs in period 12 of 
NoSpecl. Session OneMarket3 exhibits a boom and a crash during period 12. 
Though the median price in period 12 of OneMarket3 is 450, the last 12 trades 
of the period occur at prices between 15 and 30. In OneMarket4, prices surge 
above the fundamental value in period 4, and remain well above the fundamen- 
tal value until period 10. In session OneMarket2 a bubble is not observed, and 
after period 3 prices remain somewhat lower than the fundamental value. The 
main conclusion we draw from the NoSpec data is stated below as Result 1. 
12 In sessions OneMarketl-OneMarket3, each subject had an initial cash balance of 100,000 
francs, which could be viewed as a loan to be paid back to the experimenter, as in the TwoMarket 
sessions. In OneMarket4, each subject had an initial cash balance of 10,000, which was a gift to the 
subjects. In OneMarket4, subjects added their final cash balances to their earnings at the end of the 
experiment, as they did in NoSpec. 
13 In Figures 1-4, when no trade occurred during a period, the value indicated as the median 
price is the midpoint between the final offer to buy and the final offer to sell submitted during the 
period. In the figures, hollow circles indicate periods with no transactions. 
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TABLE II 
TRANSACTION VOLUMESa BY PERIOD: THE NOSPEC TREATMENT, ALL SESSIONS 
NoSpecl NoSpec2 NoSpec3 
Period Volume a/b/cb Volume a/b/c Volume a/b/c 
1 12 12/0/0 19 5/14/0 19 0/19/0 
2 3 3/0/0 10 0/3/7 16 0/15/1 
3 20 10/10/0 2 0/0/2 6 0/3/3 
4 11 0/0/11 5 0/0/5 2 0/2/0 
5 2 0/0/2 2 0/0/2 4 0/4/0 
6 5 0/0/5 1 0/0/1 4 0/3/1 
7 1 0/0/1 0 0/0/0 1 0/0/1 
8 1 0/0/1 0 0/0/0 4 0/4/0 
9 4 0/0/4 6 0/6/0 4 0/0/4 
10 3 0/0/3 2 0/0/2 5 0/0/5 
11 1 0/0/1 2 0/2/0 2 0/0/2 
12 1 0/0/1 4 0/1/3 2 0/0/2 
Totalc 64 53 69 
Turnoverd 80 88 86 
(in %) 
a Volume = total number of units traded during a period. NoSpecl-NoSpec3 are the three ilndividual 
sessions of the NoSpec treatment. 
bal/b/c: a = number of transactions at P < Min D; b = number of transactions at Min D < P < Max D; 
c = number of transactions at P > Max D. 
c Total = total number of trades in the entire session. 
dTurnover = (total number of trades in session)/(sum of the inventory of asset of all agents). 
RESULT 1: The speculative hypothesis is not supported in our data. The pursuit of 
capital gains is not the only cause of experimental asset market bubbles. 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 1: Bubbles, defined as "trade at high volumes at prices 
considerably at variance with fundamental values," occur even when purchase 
for resale is not possible. By this definition, a bubble occurs in each of the three 
NoSpec sessions. The fact that prices deviate from fundamental values is 
apparent from Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the median transaction price in each 
period for all three NoSpec sessions as well as the three comparable OneMarket 
sessions, OneMarket2-OneMarket4. In every session of NoSpec, the median 
transaction price exceeds the fundamental value by at least 30 francs for at least 
5 consecutive periods. In NoSpec3, the median price is closest to the fundamen- 
tal value in period 8, during which it exceeds the fundamental value by 31 
francs. Median period prices are either less than 50% or more than 200% of the 
fundamental value in 25% (9 out of 36) of the periods in NoSpec. Median prices 
in these nine periods are well outside the interval between the maximum 
possible realization (4/3 of the fundamental value) and the minimum possible 
realization (2/3 of the fundamental value) of the future dividend stream. 
The volume of trade in each period of each session is given in Table II in the 
columns labeled Volume. Since it is impossible to buy for resale in NoSpec, the 
highest possible trading volumes over the course of the sessions are 80 in 
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NoSpecl and NoSpec3 and 60 in NoSpec2 (20 per seller).14 The actual total 
volumes were 64, 53, and 69, representing 80%, 88% and 86% of the maximum 
possible for the three sessions, close to the highest trading volumes that could 
have been observed. The data thus indicate trade in high volumes15 at prices at 
variance from intrinsic values. 
The NoSpec treatment reproduces the price bubbles observed in earlier 
studies and replicated in our OneMarket treatment. The bubbles in NoSpec 
cannot be due to speculation, because buying and reselling is not possible. We 
do not claim that speculation does not occur in previous studies, only that the 
boom and crash price pattern can occur even without speculation. Since the 
formation of bubbles does not require speculation, the conjecture that all agents 
are rational but that the lack of common knowledge of rationality allows bubbles 
to form is refuted by the NoSpec data. 
Result 2 is concerned with two other empirical patterns in prices observed in 
earlier work. The first pattern is that the change in price from the current period 
to the next can be predicted by excess of the number of offers to buy over the 
number of offers to sell in the current period. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 
(1988), King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993), and Porter and Smith 
(1995), who observed that the effect occurred most prominently in markets in 
which bubbles were most pronounced, also identified this effect. They inter- 
preted a positive difference between the number of offers to buy and the 
number of offers to sell as a reflection of capital gains expectations. The second 
pattern, observed by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), is that transaction 
volumes are greater during the boom phase of a market than during a crash 
phase. Result 2 shows that our NoSpec data tend to reproduce subtle relation- 
ships between prices, volumes of exchange, and the number of offers to buy or 
sell, that were observed in previous studies. 
RESULT 2: Relationships between prices, quantities traded, and the number of 
offers to buy and sell, that were observed in earlier experimental studies of asset 
markets, do not require the presence of speculation. 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 2: Empirical patterns that are found in earlier studies 
are also observed in NoSpec. Specifically, (a) we replicate the finding that, when 
a boom and crash occur, changes in prices from one period to the next are 
positively related to the excess number of offers to buy over offers to sell, and 
(b) we observe that the volume of trades is greater when prices are increasing 
14 In NoSpec2 there were three sellers and four buyers, so that the total stock of X was 60 units. 
15 In the experiments of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, in which the subjects were inexperienced 
with a bubble and crash, total volume over the sessions ranged from 3.17 to 10 times the total stock 
of units. 
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TABLE III 
ESTIMATED VALUES FOR a AND b IN NOSPECa 
NoSpecl NoSpec2 NoSpec3 NoSpec OneMkt Pooled Data 
a - 62.17 - 88.48 - 63.17 -64.42c -40.42 - 38.32 
(47.59) (55.92) (49.72) (6.69) (22.8) (8.95) 
b 0.58 0.82c 0.71 .59C .22c .24c 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.88) (.05) (.005) (.03) 
n 11 11 11 33 33 66 
a NoSpec consists of the pooled data from the three NoSpec sessions. OneMarket consists of the pooled data from the 
three sessions of OneMarket with 12-period asset markets. The pooled data column consists of the data from the three 
NoSpec sessions and the three 12-period OneMarket sessions. The columns labeled NoSpecl-NoSpec3 contain OLS 
estimates of the coefficients. The numbers in parentheses are the first order autocorrelation-consistent Newey-West 
standard errors. The last three columns contain estimates from a population-averaged panel data linear regression model, 
in which the standard errors are corrected for first-order autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity within sessions. 
bSignificant at 5% level (different from - 30 for a and from 0 for b). 
c Significant at 1% level. 
than when they are decreasing. Consider the equation 
Pt -Pt_ 1 =a + b(Bt- 1- Ot- 1), 
where Pt and Pt - are the median transaction prices in periods t and t - 1, 
respectively; Bt_1 is the total number of offers to buy (bids) and Ot- 1 is the 
total number of offers to sell in period t - 1. In the estimation, a multi-unit 
offer for k units is treated as k separate offers. The coefficient a is the overall 
trend in prices. The coefficient b indicates the effect of the difference between 
the number of bids and offers in a period on price movements. The variable 
Bt- 1 - Ot- 1 is a measure of excess demand in period t - 1. Smith, Suchanek, 
and Williams (1988) tested the hypothesis that b > 0, which means that the 
median price in period t increases more (decreases less) the greater the excess 
demand in period t - 1. For our data, if prices were to track the fundamental 
value and price movements were not related to the number of offers to buy and 
sell, a would equal -30 and b would equal 0. Table III contains estimated 
values of a and b for the three sessions. In the table, the standard errors of the 
estimates are given in parentheses.16 
16 In addition to the estimates in Table III, we estimated the same equations using feasible GLS 
estimation. For the first three equations we assume an AR1 process in each session. For the last 
three equations, we estimate a panel data model, in which we assume a common coefficient of first 
order autocorrelation in all sessions and heteroscedasticity across sessions. We assume homoscedas- 
ticity within each session. All of the estimated coefficients using this alternative technique have the 
same sign as the estimates reported in Table III. In the first three equations, corresponding to the 
three individual sessions, none of the three estimated coefficients of the constant term a is 
significantly different from -30 at the 5% level. All three estimated b coefficients are significantly 
greater than zero at the 1% level. For the last three equations that use the pooled data from 
multiple sessions, each of the b estimates is significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. For the 
pooled OneMarket data and the pooled data from the two treatments, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the constant term differs from -30 at the 5% level of significance. For the pooled 
data from the NoSpec treatment the coefficient estimate of the constant term, -59.00, is borderline 
significantly different from -30 at the 5% level (p = 0.0478). 
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Two out of the three individual sessions of NoSpec, as well as the pooled data 
from all three sessions have significantly positive estimates of b. In all three 
sessions the coefficient is positive in sign. The two sessions in which b is 
significant at the 5% level, NoSpecl and NoSpec2, are the sessions in which the 
most pronounced booms and crashes were observed, as can be seen in Figure 1. 
This is consistent with previous work (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) 
report a significantly positive b in 12 of 22 sessions, but in 11 of 14 sessions 
which they classify as bubble-crash markets). Thus, we support the hypothesis 
that when a bubble occurs, the changes in prices from one period to the next are 
related to the relative number of bids and offers, in agreement with previous 
studies. None of our a estimates for the individual sessions of NoSpec are 
significantly different from the expected single-period expected dividend of - 30 
at the 5% level, also in agreement with previous studies. 
The table also contains the estimates for the pooled data from the three 
sessions of OneMarket that had an identical dividend process as the NoSpec 
treatment, as well as for the pooled data from both treatments together. The 
estimates show that our OneMarket data replicate the pattern obtained by 
previous studies. The estimated intercept of - 40.42 is not significantly different 
from - 30 and the b term of .22 is significantly positive at the 1% level. The last 
column in the table contains the estimates for the pooled data from the NoSpec 
and the OneMarket treatments (6 sessions). For the pooled data, the estimated 
intercept, - 38.32 is not significantly different from -30 and the b term is 
significantly greater than 0. 
Smith, Suchanek, and Williams also observed that the transaction volume 
tended to be greater during boom periods than during crashes. Because the 
definition of a crash is somewhat arbitrary, we evaluate the relationship between 
the direction of price movements and volumes by considering the correlation 
between the variable KP, - P, 1), the price change from one period to the next, 
and the volume of units exchanged in period t. In the pooled OneMarket data, 
the correlation is .17. The correlations are .5947, .6073, -.1470, and .4581 in 
NoSpecl, NoSpec2, NoSpec3, and the pooled data from all three sessions, 
respectively. The correlations for sessions NoSpecl, NoSpec2, and for the 
pooled data are significant at the 10% level. Thus, in NoSpec sessions, the 
volume transacted tends to be positively related to the direction of price 
movements. 
The importance of Result 2 lies in the fact that subtle empirical patterns 
observed in previous studies can be reproduced without the possibility of 
speculation. This lends further support to the idea that the patterns in the data 
observed in previous studies are not due to speculation. It also indicates that a 
positive difference between the number of offers to buy and offers to sell is not 
only a reflection of the expectation of future capital gains. Result 2 suggests that 
there are common underlying causes of the differences between transaction 
prices and fundamental values in NoSpec, and in previous studies. Agents are 
prone to errors in decision making, in the form of particular types of unprof- 
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itable transactions, and it is these errors themselves that create the boom and 
crash price dynamics in NoSpec. Result 3 below documents three phenomena, 
which are evidence of obvious errors in decision making. 
The first two phenomena documented in Result 3 are the large number of 
purchases at prices higher than the maximum possible dividend stream, and 
sales at below the minimum possible dividend stream, in NoSpec. These pur- 
chases and sales result in certain losses to one of the parties to the transaction. 
The third phenomenon is an excess amount of trade occurring under NoSpec. 
Buyers purchased almost all of the units held by the sellers over the course of 
the session. To see why this excess trade is evidence of errors in decision 
making, recall that if all agents are risk neutral, the fact that the dividend is 
identical for each agent implies that there are no gains from trade. Therefore, 
the theoretical prediction is for no trade to occur (no trade if it is postulated 
that trade involves a small transaction cost; otherwise trade could occur at the 
fundamental value, but with no gains from trade resulting). If agents had 
heterogeneous risk attitudes, then trade would occur in NoSpec. However, one 
would expect that the final holdings of buyers and sellers would on average be 
approximately the same, because there is no reason to suppose that sellers 
would be more or less risk averse than buyers on average. 
RESULT 3: In our data, systematic errors in decision making accompany the 
presence of bubbles. 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 3: Table II shows the total number of transactions in 
each of the three sessions of the NoSpec treatment in the row labeled Total. The 
percentage of the total stock of units exchanged during the session is given in 
the row labeled Turnover. The transactions are divided up into three groups in 
the table, those transactions that occurred (a) at prices below the minimum 
possible dividend stream, (b) at prices between the minimum and maximum 
possible dividend streams, and (c) at prices greater than the maximum possible 
dividend stream. The table shows that 30 of 186 total transactions (16.1%) 
occurred at prices below the minimum possible dividend stream and 70 of 186 
(37.6%) occurred at prices greater than the maximum possible dividend stream. 
Overall, 9 of the 12 buyers in the three sessions made at least one purchase at a 
price higher than the maximum possible realization of the future dividend 
stream. 3 of the 11 sellers made sales at a price lower than the minimum 
possible realization of the future dividend stream. 5 agents made at least one 
dominated transaction in the last six periods of the session. 
In NoSpecl and NoSpec2, the final inventory at the end of the experiment of 
every buyer exceeded the final inventory of every seller. Over the course of each 
session, every single buyer purchased a quantity of units, which exceeded the 
total stock of units divided by the number of subjects, and therefore held more 
units at the end of the session than the average amount held by all subjects. 
Conversely, each seller sold more than the average per-capita holding, and thus 
had a final inventory less than the average amount. In session NoSpec3, the final 
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inventory of buyers was 16, 20, 9, and 24 units of X for the four buyers 
respectively. For sellers, the final inventories were 0, 0, 11, and 0 units respec- 
tively, indicating that three of the four sellers had lower final inventory than any 
buyer, and three of the four buyers had higher final inventory than any seller 
did. 
The large volume of trade and purchases and sales at prices outside the 
feasible range of the future dividend stream observed in NoSpec may appear 
highly unusual to the reader. However, these patterns are very consistent with a 
substantial body of previous experimental research by other authors, who have 
studied the behavior of inexperienced subjects in experimental asset markets. 
The difference is that here, these transactions are inconsistent with the presence 
of speculation. Because the data are difficult to reconcile with theory, it is 
natural to conjecture that aspects of the methodology of this particular type of 
asset market experiment are the sources of the errors in decision making. The 
fact that a greater number of trades are made in NoSpec than are predicted, and 
that some of the trades are not individually rational for one side of the market, 
is consistent with a conjecture called The Active Participation Hypothesis. The 
Active Participation Hypothesis, discussed in Section 4, is a conjecture that 
subjects conclude trades in the asset market even when it is not in their best 
interest to do so, merely because trading in the asset market is the only activity 
available, and they are predisposed to participate actively in the experiment in 
some manner. Two experimental treatments, called the TwoMarket and the 
TwoMarket/NoSpec treatments, in which the asset market is one of two 
markets operating and the instructions are modified to emphasize that participa- 
tion in the asset market is optional, are designed to test this conjecture. The 
Active Participation Hypothesis suggests that there would be less trade in the 
asset market in the TwoMarket treatment than in the OneMarket treatment. 
4. THE TWOMARKET AND TWOMARKET / NOSPEC SESSIONS 
4.1. The Active Participation Hypothesis 
One possible explanation for the presence of such large volumes of trade lies 
in the methodology of the experiment. Consider a human participant in this type 
of experimental asset market, who is recruited to participate in an experiment, 
and is trained in the mechanics of buying and selling. The subject may be 
predisposed to participate actively in the experiment in some manner and to use 
his training. That is, the subject may believe that he is "supposed" to buy and 
sell because he is placed in a market environment in the role of a trader. He 
does not believe that he was recruited for the experiment to do nothing. If that 
is the case, then a subject, when faced with a choice between an unprofitable 
transaction and not trading, may choose the unprofitable transaction. We will 
use the term The Active Participation Hypothesis to refer to the hypothesis that a 
fraction of the volume in the markets is related to the fact that participation in the 
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asset market is the only activity available for subjects, and to the fact that the 
protocol of the experiment encourages them to participate in some manner. 
The Active Participation Hypothesis implies that changes in the protocol of 
the experiment, which have no impact on theoretical predictions, but allow the 
subjects to engage in an alternative activity, would reduce the amount of trade 
in the asset market. We test this hypothesis for markets in which purchase for 
resale is possible with our TwoMarket treatment, which permits subjects to 
participate actively in the experiment outside of the asset market. We also test 
the hypothesis for markets in which purchase for resale is not possible with our 
TwoMarket/NoSpec treatment. In the TwoMarket and TwoMarket/NoSpec 
treatments, as described in Section 2, we embed the asset market in a larger 
experimental economy. In the TwoMarket and TwoMarket/NoSpec treatments, 
there exists a second market operating simultaneously with the asset market. In 
one of the markets, a service called Y is traded. The market for Y is repeated 
each period under stationary supply and demand conditions as in Smith (1962), 
and thus contained profitable opportunities for participation in each period. In 
the competitive equilibrium of the Y market each agent makes two to four 
profitable transactions. 
In the other market an asset was traded. In TwoMarket, all subjects could 
both buy and sell units in the asset market. In TwoMarket/NoSpec, each 
subject had the role of either a buyer or a seller in the asset market. The asset 
market opened after the service market was already in operation for four 
periods (one practice period and three periods that counted), to ensure that 
subjects were already participating in the service market. As indicated in Section 
2, in our instructions to the subjects, it was emphasized that participation in the 
asset market was optional. A subject who felt compelled to make transactions 
could actively participate in the market for Y and not affect the market for X. 
The data are interpreted to support the Active Participation Hypothesis, if the 
volume of trade declines in the asset market in the TwoMarket or TwoMarket/ 
NoSpec sessions relative to benchmark experiments in which the asset market is 
the only market operating. If the Active Participation Hypothesis is false, there 
is no reason to suppose any difference in quantities transacted. 
4.2. Results from the TwoMarket and TwoMarket/NoSpec Treatments 
Figures 2 and 3 show the time series of transaction prices in the TwoMarket 
treatment and in comparable OneMarket sessions. Tables IVA and IVB show 
the actual volumes by period in the ten sessions. In the tables, we include the 
quantities transacted in the baseline OneMarket experiments, in which the asset 
market was the only market operating, and the initial endowment of X and cash 
was the same as in TwoMarket. The OneMarket sessions provide a benchmark 
to establish whether the TwoMarket treatment lowers quantity traded. 
Estimates of the effects of the different treatments on turnover by period and 
on the deviation of median period price from the fundamental by period are 
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FIGURE 2.-Time series of median transaction prices by period: 15-Period Asset Markets, 
OneMarket and TwoMarket treatments. 
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FIGURE 3.-Time series of median transaction prices by period: 12-Period Asset Markets, 
OneMarket and TwoMarket treatments. 
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TABLE IVA 
TRANSACTION VOLUMES BY PERIOD: 15-PERIOD ASSET MARKETS, ONEMARKET AND 
TWOMARKET TREATMENTS 
Period TwoMktl TwoMkt2 TwoMkt3 TwoMkt4 OneMktl 
4 5 20 4 5 41 
5 2 5 5 3 27 
6 1 2 11 2 27 
7 2 3 3 5 34 
8 1 1 2 7 31 
9 0 2 0 9 10 
10 1 1 4 4 16 
11 0 2 0 3 16 
12 0 1 2 4 20 
13 1 5 2 10 10 
14 2 3 5 3 11 
15 1 8 0 7 15 
16 0 2 4 3 5 
17 1 3 5 6 1 
18 0 14 15 50 0 
Total 17 72 62 121 264 
Turnover (%) 28 90 89 151 377 
TABLE IVB 
TRANSACTION VOLUMES BY PERIOD: 12-PERIOD ASSET MARKETS, ONEMARKET AND 
TWOMARKET TREATMENTS 
Period TwoMkt5 TwoMkt6 OneMkt2 OneMkt3 OneMkt4 
4 6 3 33 76 40 
5 3 5 27 104 29 
6 2 1 37 31 42 
7 3 1 5 42 22 
8 3 1 16 32 36 
9 1 6 9 32 27 
10 3 2 21 75 22 
11 2 8 9 94 14 
12 2 8 11 81 28 
13 3 9 8 58 39 
14 5 1 7 96 27 
15 2 4 11 67 7 
Total 35 49 194 788 333 
Turnover (%) 50 61 277 1126 476 
given in Table V.17 P, is the median price in period t; f, is the fundamental 
value in period t. The variable IP - fj, the dependent variable in regression 
17 We have also estimated the models presented in Table V using feasible GLS estimation of a 
panel data model under the assumption of a first-order autocorrelation coefficient that is common to 
all sessions. The estimation assumes heteroscedasticity between sessions but homoscedasticity within 
a given session. The estimates are similar to those reported in Table V with some minor differences. 
All coefficients have the same sign as in Table V. However, in equation (2), the coefficient of the 
constant term is significant at the 5% level but not at the 1% level. The coefficient of the variable 
Complex Dividend is significant at the 5% level (but not at the 1% level) in both equations (1) and 
(2). All of the coefficients that are significant (insignificant) at the 5% (1%) level in equations (3) and 
(4) in Table V remain so under the feasible GLS estimation. 
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equations (1) and (2) in Table V, measures the absolute deviation of median 
price from the fundamental value in period t. The variable Turnover, the 
dependent variable in equations (3) and (4), is the percentage of the total stock 
of units (the sum of the holdings of X of all agents) that is traded during a 
period. OneMarket is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the data are from the 
baseline OneMarket treatment and 0 otherwise. NoSpec, TwoMarket, and 
TwoMarket/NoSpec are analogous dummy variables for the three other treat- 
ments. Complex Dividend equals 1 if dividends are drawn from the four-point 
distribution and 0 if they are drawn from the two-point distribution. In all of the 
regressions the unit of observation is an individual period in a session. Result 4 
and it's supporting argument give our characterization of the quantity patterns 
in the data, and the differences between the TwoMarket and the OneMarket 
data. 
RESULT 4: The Active Participation Hypothesis is supported in markets in which 
speculation is permitted. Volume in the asset market is significantl lower in 
TwoMarket than in OneMarket. 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 4: In the TwoMarket treatment the volumes traded in 
the asset market are lower than under OneMarket. The data in Tables IVA and 
IVB indicate that the volumes in TwoMarket are between 28 and 151 percent of 
the total stock of units, much lower than in the OneMarket data reported in the 
tables. The estimates in regression equation (3) of Table V show that the 
addition of the second market reduced volume traded in the average market 
period by 34.68% of the total stock of units. The constant term is the estimated 
turnover per period in the baseline OneMarket treatment (with the simple 
two-point distribution of dividends), and the coefficient on TwoMarket equals 
the effect of adding the second market. Only data from markets with speculation 
are included in regression (3). The standard error of 13.02 indicates that the 
amount of the reduction is highly significant. 
However, adding a second market does not eliminate bubbles in the asset 
market. The price patterns in TwoMarket are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. The 
prices from OneMarket are included for comparison. In Figure 2, in all four 
sessions of TwoMarket, the median transaction prices are higher than the 
fundamental values in each period until at least period 14.18 In some of the 
sessions the prices fall rapidly toward the fundamental values in late periods. 
For example, a crash is observed in period 14 of session TwoMkt3. Figure 3 
18 In session TwoMarketl, there are 7 trades (for a total of 11 units exchanged since one trade 
was for 5 units) in periods 4 and 5 at very high prices. These trades were due to two subjects failing 
to understand the distinction between a total price and a per-unit price. For example, one of them 
purchased 5 units at 2,000, believing that he was paying 400 for each unit. Their losses from periods 
4-6, the first three periods of the asset market, were written off by the experimenter to avoid the 
possibility of their behavior being influenced by the possibility of receiving negative overall earnings 
in the experiment. These data are not included in the figures, tables, or analysis of the data in the 
paper. 
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shows that the data from TwoMarket5 and TwoMarket6 tend to track the 
fundamental value fairly closely throughout the session. 
The TwoMarket treatment did not significantly reduce the average deviation 
of median price from the fundamental value. Regression (1) of Table V contains 
the estimated effect of the TwoMarket treatment on the absolute deviation of 
median transaction price from the fundamental value by period. The constant 
term is the estimate for the OneMarket treatment. The dummy variable 
TwoMarket has a coefficient of - 57.40, and was not statistically significant. 
Result 4 indicates that the existence of the second market and the changes in 
the instructions indicating that participation was optional, drastically reduced 
participation in the asset market, in a manner consistent with the Active 
Participation Hypothesis. In addition to the total volume of trade, the number of 
buyers making purchases and sales in each period in the asset market differed 
between the OneMarket and the TwoMarket sessions. In an average period of 
OneMarket, 88% of the subjects bought or sold at least one unit, and 61% did 
both. In contrast, in an average period in the TwoMarket sessions, 45% made 
some kind of transaction and 9% made both purchases and sales. Thus, subtle 
features of the experimental design influence the level of participation in the 
asset market. However, because the boom and crash price dynamics are ob- 
served in the majority of the TwoMarket sessions, "excess volume" is not at the 
origin of the boom and crash price pattern. 
Result 5 considers the TwoMarket/NoSpec treatment. The effect of adding 
the service market is evident. TwoMarket/NoSpec had a strong tendency to 
TABLE V 
THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT TREATMENTS ON AMPLITUDE OF BUBBLES AND ON TURNOVER a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Turnover (in %) Turnover (in %) 
lMkt and 2Mkt NoSpec and 
Treatment Pt -ftl IPt -ftI Data 2Mkt/NS Data 
Constant 160.79b 91.61C 47.61C 4.95c 
(74.51) (27.46) (16.02) (1.41) 
OneMarket 69.18 
(79.41) 
NoSpec - 21.01 48.17 2.56b 
(81.25) (42.46) (1.46) 
TwoMarket - 57.40 11.78 - 34.68c 
(91.68) (72.35) (13.02) 
TwoMkt/NoSpec -69.18 
(79.41) 
Complex Dividend 47.14 47.14 - 7.80 
(80.91) (80.91) (10.04) 
XX 22.50 2.50 7.11 3.07 
p 0.65 0.65 0.03 0.08 
ii 207 207 135 72 
a The coefficients are estimates from a population-averaged panel data linear regression model, where the 
standard errors, given in parentheses, are corrected for first-order autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity within 
sessions. p is the significance level of a chi-sqtiared test that all of the slope coefficients (those other than the 
constant term) are equal to 0. 
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 1% level. 
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reduce the number of dominated purchases and sales from the level in NoSpec. 
This suggests that many of the errors in decision making in NoSpec can be 
attributed to the Active Participation Hypothesis. 
RESULT 5: The existence of a second market reduces the incidence of dominated 
transactions in markets in which speculation is not possible. There is no evidence of 
excess trade in TwoMarket/NoSpec. 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 5: Adding the second market reduces the number of 
dominated transactions. Table VI also shows the incidence of trading at prices 
above the maximum possible and below the minimum possible dividend stream. 
In the three sessions of TwoMarket/NoSpec 82.9%, 4.9%, and 8.3% of the 
transactions were of one of those two types, compared to 84.4%, 50.9%, and 
27.5% in the three sessions of NoSpec. In TwoMarket/NoSpec5, 5 of the 17 
buyers made a purchase at a price higher than the maximum possible realization 
of the future dividend stream and 1 of the 19 sellers made a sale at a price 
below the minimum possible future stream of dividends. Only 2 agents made 
dominated transactions in the last 6 periods. These are much lower percentages 
than under NoSpec. 
The transaction volume in each session of the TwoMarket/NoSpec treatment 
is shown in Table VI. On average in the three sessions, 59% of the total stock of 
units changed hands, compared to 85% for the NoSpec treatment. Regression 
(4) in Table V shows the estimated turnover. In the equation, the data from 
NoSpec and TwoMarket/NoSpec are included in the estimation. The coefficient 
on the constant term is the mean turnover in TwoMarket/NoSpec and the 
coefficient on NoSpec measures the effect of removing the service market. The 
TABLE VI 
TRANSACTION VOLUMES: THE TWOMKT/NOSPEC TREATMENT 
TwoMkt/NoSpecla TwoMkt/NoSpec2 TwoMkt/NoSpec3 
Period Volume a/b/c Volume a/b/c Volume a/b/c 
4 9 0/4/5 3 0/0/3 3 0/3/0 
5 5 0/0/5 2 0/2/0 1 0/0/1 
6 5 0/0/5 0 0/0/0 10 0/10/0 
7 14 0/0/14 20 0/20/0 7 0/7/0 
8 11 0/0/11 10 0/10/0 3 1/2/0 
9 7 0/0/7 0 0/0/0 3 0/3/0 
10 6 0/2/4 7 0/7/0 0 0/0/0 
11 14 0/5/9 3 0/3/0 1 0/1/0 
12 8 0/2/6 4 0/4/0 2 0/2/0 
13 9 0/6/3 6 0/6/0 1 0/1/0 
14 4 0/0/4 3 0/3/0 4 0/4/0 
15 19 0/0/19 3 0/3/0 1 1/0/0 
Total 111 61 36 
Turnover 79 76 23 
(in %) 
aa/b/c: a = number of transactions at P < Min D; b = number of transactions at Min D < P < Max D; c = number of 
transactions at P > Max D. 
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This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 17:24:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS 855 
estimated constant is 4.95, not significantly different from 4.17, the per-period 
average if total turnover equals 50, or 50% of the total stock, over the 12 period 
life of the asset. The estimated turnover in NoSpec is not significantly different 
from the estimated turnover in TwoMarket/NoSpec, though it is significantly 
different from 4.17, at the p < 5% level. 
The median price time series for TwoMarket/NoSpec are shown in Figure 4. 
In session TwoMarket/NoSpecl, a bubble is observed, and in TwoMarket/No- 
Spec2, there are two transactions at high prices early in the session, but median 
prices track the fundamental value closely thereafter. In TwoMarket/NoSpec3, 
median prices are close to fundamental values beginning in period 6, the third 
period of the life of the asset market. The estimated coefficient on the constant 
term in regression (2) equals the average deviation of median period price from 
fundamental values in TwoMarket/NoSpec (in TwoMarket/NoSpec the value 
of all of the dummy variables other than the constant are equal to 0). Since the 
estimate is significantly different from 0 at the p < .01 level, the average value of 
P, -f, I remains significantly different from 0 under TwoMarket/NoSpec. 
However, because adding the second market does reduce the number of 
errors made, we conjecture that it reduces the chance that a bubble will occur. 
We state this as a conjecture because of the fact that the coefficients on NoSpec 
and OneMarket indicate that the value of IP - f I in NoSpec and in OneMarket 
are not significantly greater than that in TwoMarket/NoSpec at the 5% level of 
significance. We believe that the difference would become significant with more 
observations, and that with more data it would be possible to convincingly claim 
that, in markets without speculation, the probability of a bubble is lower when a 
service market is present. Result 6 considers patterns in the data in the market 
for Y in both the TwoMarket and TwoMarket/NoSpec treatments. In previous 
studies, double auction markets for services have been shown to reliably 
converge to the competitive equilibrium. We observe the same pattern here. 
RESULT 6: In TwoMarket and TwoMarket/NoSpec, departures of prices from 
fundamental values are a specific characteristic of the asset markets that does 
not extend to the service markets. 
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 6: In the market for Y, in both TwoMarket and 
TwoMarket/NoSpec, prices and quantities exchanged converge to the competi- 
tive equilibrium, despite the departures of prices from fundamental values in the 
X market. The median transaction price by period in the market for Y in the 
pooled data of the six TwoMarket sessions is within 5% of the competitive 
equilibrium price for 97% of the periods after period 2 (87 out of 90 periods). 
The market-level quantity traded differs by one unit or less from the competitive 
equilibrium level after period 2 in 67% of the periods in the pooled data (60 out 
of 90 periods). As for TwoMarket/NoSpec, the median price is within 5% of the 
competitive equilibrium level in 87% (34 out of 39) of the periods. The market 
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quantity traded is within one unit of the equilibrium level in 64% (25 out of 39) 
of the periods.19 
Result 6 shows that, even as the service market converges to the equilibrium, 
the asset market, in which the same participants are interacting at the same time 
as in the service market, produces prices that are very far from the fundamental 
value of the asset. Prices in one market can correspond closely to the theoretical 
prediction while they differ greatly in another market. In the service market, 
individual behavior resembles behavior generated by optimizing agents. Thus 
the "irrationality" documented in Result 3 is not a general property of the 
subjects themselves, but a property of their behavior in the asset market 
specifically. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Why do bubbles occur in experimental asset markets? The existence of the 
phenomenon has been attributed to the lack of common knowledge of rational- 
ity and consequent speculation. If this theory is accepted, then the existence of 
speculative opportunities is a necessary condition for the existence of bubbles. 
The research reported here investigated the role of speculation in creating asset 
market bubbles. 
The data provide strong evidence that the ability to speculate is not essential 
to creating the bubble-crash price dynamics. We make this claim based on the 
fact that we have been able to reproduce the empirical patterns of the previous 
studies discussed above even in the NoSpec treatment, in which there is no 
possibility of speculation. As in Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), we 
observe bubbles in our NoSpec treatment, characterized by (a) prices lower than 
fundamental values at the beginning of all but one of the sessions, (b) booms in 
every session, and (c) crashes in some of the sessions. We also observe (d) that 
the movement of prices from one period to the next is positively related to the 
difference between the number of offers to buy and offers to sell, and (e) that 
trading volume is greater when prices are increasing than when they are 
19 In 12 of the 30 periods of TwoMarket in which transaction volume in the service market 
differed from the competitive equilibrium by more than one unit, the volume was lower than the 
equilibrium level. In the other 18 of the 30 periods it was higher than at the equilibrium. In the 
TwoMarket/NoSpec data the volume was greater than the competitive equilibrium level in each of 
the eight periods in which the difference was greater than 1. Because the deviations from 
equilibrium volume did not tend to be negative, they do not suggest that time constraints played a 
major role in restricting the volume of trade. In fact, on average, the sum of the quantities 
exchanged in the two markets of TwoMarket was less than in the single market of OneMarket. That 
indicates that volume in TwoMarket was below the upper limit of the volumes that could by traded 
in a period. The relatively frequent incidence of departures from the equilibrium quantity traded in 
the service market of TwoMarket appears to be related to the fact that both the market demand and 
supply curves, which are described in footnote 10, are very elastic in the region of the equilibrium. 
This allows extramarginal buyers and sellers to frequently have opportunities to conclude profitable 
trades if some trading prices deviate only slightly from the competitive equilibrium. 
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decreasing. Thus the pursuit of capital gains is not the only force driving the 
asset prices to deviate from fundamental values. 
We also observe behaviors that can be clearly classified as decision errors. In 
our NoSpec data, many traders make purchases at prices higher than the 
maximum possible realization of the dividend stream. However, they do not buy 
because they are rational traders who expect to be able to sell at a higher price, 
since even if prices increase further later in the experiment, the purchaser is not 
better off. 
We do not interpret our data as suggesting that the conscious pursuit of 
capital gains does not occur in experiments of this type. Our claim is merely that 
speculation is not necessary to create large deviations from fundamental values 
following the boom and crash pattern. The data show that any explanation of 
the bubble phenomenon, which relies on the possibility of speculation, does not 
provide a complete account. Thus, the hypothesis that the traders are rational, 
and that the bubble is due to the fact that this rationality is not common 
knowledge, cannot be the whole story behind the bubbles. Of course, it may be 
the case that rationality is not common knowledge, in that traders believe that 
other traders make errors, such as making purchases and sales when it is not in 
their interest to do so. However, these beliefs appear to be justified in that many 
purchases at prices above the maximum possible dividend stream and sales 
below the minimum possible dividend stream are observed under NoSpec. 
In Section 4 we investigated a possible methodological explanation for the 
errors in decision making observed in NoSpec. The explanation was suggested by 
the large observed transaction volumes, which are difficult to reconcile with 
theory. To explain the high volume, we formulated a conjecture called the 
Active Participation Hypothesis. The conjecture asserts that some trades in the 
asset market are related to the fact that there are no activities available for 
subjects in the experiment, other than to trade in the asset market, and that 
subjects prefer making purchases and sales to doing nothing. The hypothesis is 
consistent with the common sense notion that if a participant is trained to buy 
and sell at the beginning of an experimental session, he may believe that buying 
and selling is in itself one of the objectives in the experiment. 
The TwoMarket and TwoMarket/NoSpec treatments were designed to try to 
reduce the level of this phenomenon. In markets with resale, we observed that 
much of the turnover in the asset market was eliminated when an alternative 
activity was available. Volume decreased sharply in TwoMarket, a treatment in 
which buying for resale was permitted, supporting the Active Participation 
Hypothesis. Though the volume in TwoMarket was low, the prices continued to 
follow the boom and crash pattern. The TwoMarket treatment illustrates that 
the fact that only one market is available promotes activity in the market, and 
the Active Participation Hypothesis must be taken seriously in asset markets of 
the type studied here. 
The TwoMarket/NoSpec treatment allowed us to consider whether the 
Active Participation Hypothesis was the source of the bubbles in NoSpec. The 
results are mixed. The incidence of dominated purchases and sales declined, as 
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did the proportion of the sessions in which bubbles were observed. However, a 
substantial number of dominated transactions still occurred in TwoMarket/No- 
Spec, and a bubble was observed in one session. We conclude that the lack of an 
alternative activity in the experiment explains some of the anomalous behavior 
in NoSpec, but does not account for it entirely. 
A full investigation of the reasons behind the bubble phenomenon is far 
beyond the scope of a single set of experiments or a single paper. However, a 
brief description of what we think we have seen in our experiment might be 
useful. The behavior exhibited by the asset markets over time appears to have 
stages not unlike the stages that have been postulated for other experiments 
(Plott (1996)). The beginning involves some confusion and irrationality. Subjects 
may not fully understand the nature of the task or the structure of the asset, 
especially when first exposed to it. This lack of understanding facilitates particu- 
lar types of decision errors, which allow for the formation of the bubble. Thus, 
when the asset market begins operating, not only is there a lack of common 
knowledge of rationality, there is a lack of rationality itself, in the sense that at 
least some traders tend to be confused by the particular environment of the 
asset market. 
Over the course of the experiment, some traders come to realize that there is 
the possibility of irrational behavior on the part of other traders. This realization 
promotes speculation. Later, experience and practice reduce subject confusion 
and remove the irrationality of market participants. Once the irrationality has 
been removed, the new information about the change in the environment must 
be transmitted to the market. If our view is correct, that transmission takes the 
form of a crash. That is, the market crash is the vehicle whereby the newly 
established rationality of market participants becomes common knowledge. 
The duration of a bubble in the NoSpec treatment measures the length of 
time that irrationality is present among market participants. This is because 
bubbles in NoSpec must indicate actual irrationality, not the lack of common 
knowledge of rationality. Because there is no evidence that the length of time 
the bubbles last is any shorter in NoSpec than in the other treatments in which 
speculation is possible, the period of time in which rationality is present but is 
not common knowledge is likely to be at most very short. Therefore, price 
crashes in markets with resale appear also to correspond to the beginning of the 
existence of rationality itself among all active market participants, rather than 
merely the beginning of common knowledge of rationality already present. 
The importance of instructions and the issue of subject comprehension have 
certainly not escaped the attention of experimental economists. However, be- 
cause the experimental procedures followed in asset market experiments were 
so carefully developed and because the theory of the lack of common knowledge 
of rationality is so compelling, the issue of procedures in asset market experi- 
ments has not been closely scrutinized. The research reported here suggests that 
the phenomenon of bubbles and crashes could have origins in aspects of the 
methodology of the experiment. If this assessment is correct, then research is 
able to proceed along different theoretical lines in the attempt to understand 
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the general process of price discovery and the dynamics of market adjustments. 
In particular, the bubbles and crashes observed in experimental economies 
provide a rich opportunity to study the nature of learning and mistakes by 
individual traders in asset markets. 
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